Friday, January 31, 2014
Predictability and correlation
Today another little note that I discovered while teaching. Warning: this will only be of any interest at all to time-series finance academics. I'll try to come back with something practical soon!
Does the predictability of stock returns from variables such as the dividend yield imply that stocks are safer in the long run? The answer would seem to be yes -- price drops mean expected return rises, bringing prices back and making stocks safer in the long run. In fact, the answer is no: it is possible to see strong predctability of returns from dividend yields, yet stocks are completely uncorrelated on their own.
I've been through three versions of showing how this paradox works. In Asset Pricing the best I could come up with was a complex factorization of the spectral density matrix in order to derive the univariate process for returns implied by the VAR. In later Ph.D. classes, I found a way to do it more simply, by seeing that returns have to follow an ARMA(1,1), and then matching coefficients. This year, I found a way to show it even more simply and intuitively. Here goes.
Background: The mean and variance of two year log returns is
\begin{eqnarray} E\left( r_{t+1}+r_{t+2}\right) &=& 2E(r) \\ \sigma ^{2}\left( r_{t+1}+r_{t+2}\right) &=& 2\sigma ^{2}(r)+2cov(r_{t+1},r_{t+2}). \end{eqnarray}
If returns are independent over time, the covariance term is zero, and both mean and variance scale linearly with horizon. The ratio of mean to variance \( E\left( r_{t+1}+r_{t+2}\right) /\sigma ^{2}\left( r_{t+1}+r_{t+2}\right) \) which (roughly) controls portfolio allocation is then the same at any horizon. If the covariance term is negative, stocks bounce back after declines, so the variance scales less than linearly with horizon, and stocks are safer for long-run investors. (Yes, I'm mixing logs and levels like crazy here, but this is a back of the envelope blog post.)
So, our issue is, are stock returns correlated over time? Stock returns are, in fact, predictable from variables such as dividend yields. But that does not mean they are predictable at all from past returns, correlated over time, and thus any safer for long-run investors. This is the nice little paradox.
Sum up the simplest version of stock predictability with a vector autoregression
\begin{eqnarray} r_{t+1} &=& b_{r}dp_{t}+\varepsilon _{t+1}^{r} \\ \Delta d_{t+1} &=& b_{d}dp_{t}+\varepsilon _{t+1}^{d} \\ dp_{t+1} &=& \phi dp_{t}+\varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp} \end{eqnarray}
Here \( dp \) is the log dividend yield and \(\Delta d\) is log dividend growth. The return coefficient is about \(b_{r}\approx 0.1\) and the dividend growth coefficient is about zero \(b_{d}\approx 0\), and \(\phi \approx 0.94.\)
So, low prices mean high subsequent returns, and high prices (relative to dividends) mean low subsequent returns. It would seem that stocks are indeed much safer for long-run investors, as there really is a sense that low prices are temporarily low and will revert if you can wait long enough.
More seductively, if you plot the impulse-response function to dividend growth \(\varepsilon _{t}^{d}\) shocks and dividend yield \(\varepsilon _{t}^{dp}\) shocks, you see the former is a cashflow shock, giving a one-time shock to returns and a random walk in prices. (Top) But the dividend yield shock is an expected return shock, yielding a completely temporary component to prices -- green line bottom right. If prices go up and dividends go up too, the movement is permanent. If prices go up and dividends do not move, the price movement is completely transitory, and perfectly safe in the long run. Stocks are like long term bonds plus iid cashflow risk.
You would think therefore that just seeing prices go up, with no information about dividends, you would have something between the two; a partially transitory movement in stock prices that is somewhat safer in the long run.
You would be wrong.
Let's figure out the correlation of returns \(cov(r_{t+1},r_{t+2})\) implied by this little VAR. Use the VAR to write
\begin{eqnarray} r_{t+1} &=& b_{r}dp_{t}+\varepsilon _{t+1}^{r} \\ r_{t+2} &=& b_{r}\phi dp_{t}+b_{r}\varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp}+\varepsilon_{t+2}^{r} \end{eqnarray}
so
\begin{eqnarray} cov(r_{t+1},r_{t+2}) &=& cov\left[ b_{r}dp_{t}+\varepsilon _{t+1}^{r},b_{r}\left( \phi dp_{t}+\varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp}\right) +\varepsilon _{t+2}^{r}\right] \\ cov(r_{t+1},r_{t+2}) &=& b_{r}^{2}\phi \sigma ^{2}(dp_{t})+b_{r}cov(\varepsilon _{t+1}^{r},\varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp}) \end{eqnarray}
The first term \(b_{r}^{2}\phi \sigma ^{2}(dp)\) induces a positive autocorrelation or momentum, making stocks actually riskier for long term investors. \(dp_{t}\) moves slowly over time, so if returns \(r_{t+1}\) are higher than usual, then returns \(r_{t+2}\) are likely to be higher than usual as well. This term makes stocks riskier in the long run.
The second term \(b_{r}cov(\varepsilon _{t+1}^{r},\varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp})\) is strongly negative. If there is a positive shock to expected returns, this sends current prices and hence current returns down. In this way stocks are like bonds: if yields rise, prices fall and current returns fall. This is the safer in the long-run term.
The fun part: In the standard parameterization, these effects almost exactly offset.
To show this fact, we need to find just how negative \(cov(\varepsilon _{t+1}^{r},\varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp})\) is. Campbell and Shiller's linearized return identity,
\begin{equation} r_{t+1}\approx -\rho dp_{t+1}+dp_{t}+\Delta d_{t+1}; \rho \approx 0.96 \end{equation}
implies the VAR coefficients and errors satisfy the identities.
\begin{eqnarray} b_{r} &\approx& 1-\rho \phi +b_{d}\approx 1-\rho \phi \\ \varepsilon _{t+1}^{r} &\approx& -\rho \varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp}+\varepsilon _{t+1}^{d} \end{eqnarray}
Now, empirically, dividend growth shocks and dividend yield shocks are just about uncorrelated, \(cov(\varepsilon _{t+1}^{d},\varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp})\approx 0\). So, the correlation we're looking for is
\begin{equation} cov(\varepsilon _{t+1}^{r},\varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp})=-\rho \sigma ^{2}\left( \varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp}\right) . \end{equation}
Now,we have an expression for the covariance of return and dp shocks, so we can continue
\begin{eqnarray} cov(r_{t+1},r_{t+2}) &=& b_{r}^{2}\phi \sigma ^{2}(dp_{t})-b_{r}\rho \sigma ^{2}\left( \varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp}\right) \\ &=& b_{r}\left( \phi \frac{1-\rho \phi }{1-\phi ^{2}}-\rho \right) \sigma ^{2}\left( \varepsilon _{t+1}^{dp}\right) \end{eqnarray}
If we had \(\phi =\rho =0.96=0\), we get the result, \(cov(r_{t+1},r_{t+2})=0.\) Now, \(\phi \approx 0.94\) is the usual estimate. But \(\phi \) is an OLS\ estimate of a very persistent series, so biased down. \(\phi =0.96\) is not that far off.
So, pretty much, dividend yield predictability coexists with complete lack of return autocorrelation. The momentum effect of a slow-moving forecast variable exactly offsets the bond yield effect that high prices mean low subsequent returns.
That does not mean that predictability is unimportant for long term investors. A properly done (Merton) portfolio theory isn't as simple as
\begin{equation} w= \frac{1}{\gamma }\frac{E(R^{e})}{\sigma ^{2}(R^{e})} \end{equation}.
It turns out there is a market timing demand and a hedging demand. The hedging demand is positive in our case. So, it's still possible that long-run investors should put more into stocks, even though simple Sharpe ratios are not better at long horizons. I haven't yet found a simple way to calculate hedging demands however.
Update: A correspondent tells me this example is in a set of John Campbell lecture notes he "inherited distantly."
Monday, January 27, 2014
Prices and Returns
Warning: this will only be interesting to academic finance people.
One of the fun things about teaching is that it forces me to look back at old ideas and refine them. Last week, I needed a problem set for my MBA class. It occurred to me, why not have them do for returns what Shiller did for dividends?
Here it is
At each date \( t \) I plot the return and final terms of the Campbell-Shiller identity
\( p_t - d_t = \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^{\tau-t-1} \Delta d_{\tau} - \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^{\tau-t-1} r_{\tau} + \rho^{T-\tau} \left( p_T-d_T \right) \)
where p = log price, d = log dividend, r = return, \(\rho = 0.96\)
In words, plot at each date the actual price-dividend ratio, the corresponding ex-post dividends, the corresponding ex-post return, and ex-post terminal price. (There is no expectation on the right hand side.) Shiller plots the price, dividend and terminal price term, (see here). I'm just adding the return term.
What does this mean? Shiller's plots contrast actual prices with what prices would be if clairvoyant investors knew what actual dividends would be and discounted at a constant rate. It's a total bust. Here, we're looking at, what would prices be if clairvoyant investors knew what actual returns were going to be, but thought dividends would never change. As you can see, actual prices almost exactly mirror these "ex-post rationally discounted" prices!
A second, deeper, meaning. It is more conventional to make this decomposition using expected values,
\( p_t - d_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^{\tau-t-1} \Delta d_{\tau} - \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^{\tau-t-1} r_{\tau} + \rho^{T-\tau} \left( p_T-d_T \right) \right] \)
For \(E_t\) we use regression based forecasts, for example by running long-run returns on dividend yields and a vector of other variables. If you use dividend yields as the forecasting variable then each term is just a number times dividend yield at time t. To be specific, if you run
\( \sum_{j=1}^k \rho^{j-1} r_{t+j} = a + b^r \times (p_t-d_t)+\varepsilon^r \)
Then the three terms are
\( p_t - d_t = b^d \times (p_t-d_t) - b^r \times (p_t-d_t) + b^{pd} \times (p_t-d_t) \)
Yes, there are separate red and blue lines. Price-dividend ratios do not forecast dividend growth so the green line is flat. Price dividend ratios do forecast returns, just enough to account for the volatility of prices.
Now, to the point: What if we add more variables to forecast returns and dividend growth? Investors surely use lots of information. That would surely change our understanding of the sources of price volatility, no? In "Discount rates" I tried Lettau and Ludvigson's cay variable. It did a great job of forecasting short run returns. But it decays quickly, and doesn't change this long run picture much at all.
Ok, but surely there are other variables out there that can forecast returns and dividend growth, that could upend the whole picture, no?
My top picture answers that question. Even if you can perfectly forecast returns, you will not substantially change the decomposition of price-dividend ratio volatility. The ex-post values are a sort of upper bound for how much things can ever change, no matter how much more information we stick in the VAR. And the answer is, no matter how we change short-run return forecasts, no matter what information set we use, the decomposition of price volatility will still say the vast majority of price-dividend ratio variation comes from expected returns. (And, likewise, Shiller's plots for ex-post dividends say that no matter how many variables you try, dividend forecasts will not explain much price-dividend ratio volatility.)
You may either pity or admire my MBAs who put up with this sort of thing on a weekly basis. If you want more details or documentation, it's problem set 3 here. Now, back to writing Problem set 5.
One of the fun things about teaching is that it forces me to look back at old ideas and refine them. Last week, I needed a problem set for my MBA class. It occurred to me, why not have them do for returns what Shiller did for dividends?
Here it is
At each date \( t \) I plot the return and final terms of the Campbell-Shiller identity
\( p_t - d_t = \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^{\tau-t-1} \Delta d_{\tau} - \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^{\tau-t-1} r_{\tau} + \rho^{T-\tau} \left( p_T-d_T \right) \)
where p = log price, d = log dividend, r = return, \(\rho = 0.96\)
In words, plot at each date the actual price-dividend ratio, the corresponding ex-post dividends, the corresponding ex-post return, and ex-post terminal price. (There is no expectation on the right hand side.) Shiller plots the price, dividend and terminal price term, (see here). I'm just adding the return term.
A second, deeper, meaning. It is more conventional to make this decomposition using expected values,
\( p_t - d_t = E_t \left[ \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^{\tau-t-1} \Delta d_{\tau} - \sum_{\tau=t}^T \rho^{\tau-t-1} r_{\tau} + \rho^{T-\tau} \left( p_T-d_T \right) \right] \)
For \(E_t\) we use regression based forecasts, for example by running long-run returns on dividend yields and a vector of other variables. If you use dividend yields as the forecasting variable then each term is just a number times dividend yield at time t. To be specific, if you run
\( \sum_{j=1}^k \rho^{j-1} r_{t+j} = a + b^r \times (p_t-d_t)+\varepsilon^r \)
Then the three terms are
\( p_t - d_t = b^d \times (p_t-d_t) - b^r \times (p_t-d_t) + b^{pd} \times (p_t-d_t) \)
Since \(b^r \approx -1 \) (i.e. the regression coefficient of long run returns on d-p has a coefficient of about +1) \( b^d \approx 0 , \ b^{pd}\approx 0 \) we see that the discount rate term accounts for all price volatility. Plotting the terms is pretty boring:
Yes, there are separate red and blue lines. Price-dividend ratios do not forecast dividend growth so the green line is flat. Price dividend ratios do forecast returns, just enough to account for the volatility of prices.
Now, to the point: What if we add more variables to forecast returns and dividend growth? Investors surely use lots of information. That would surely change our understanding of the sources of price volatility, no? In "Discount rates" I tried Lettau and Ludvigson's cay variable. It did a great job of forecasting short run returns. But it decays quickly, and doesn't change this long run picture much at all.
Ok, but surely there are other variables out there that can forecast returns and dividend growth, that could upend the whole picture, no?
My top picture answers that question. Even if you can perfectly forecast returns, you will not substantially change the decomposition of price-dividend ratio volatility. The ex-post values are a sort of upper bound for how much things can ever change, no matter how much more information we stick in the VAR. And the answer is, no matter how we change short-run return forecasts, no matter what information set we use, the decomposition of price volatility will still say the vast majority of price-dividend ratio variation comes from expected returns. (And, likewise, Shiller's plots for ex-post dividends say that no matter how many variables you try, dividend forecasts will not explain much price-dividend ratio volatility.)
You may either pity or admire my MBAs who put up with this sort of thing on a weekly basis. If you want more details or documentation, it's problem set 3 here. Now, back to writing Problem set 5.
Tuesday, January 21, 2014
Bubble Busters
The latest profession to be displaced by technology: Liberal pundit.
Bubble Busters
Bubble Busters™ the App is a one-of-a-kind toolbox for progressives that provides fingertip access to numerous stats, graphs, talking points, quotes, analogies, and more to use with far-right conservatives when discussing topics ranging from health care reform to gun control to income inequality. It's everything a progressive would want all in one convenient place. Whether you are a policy expert looking for new ideas or a novice looking to understand the issues better - this is app a must have!
Created by progressives for progressives, Bubble Busters™ the App includes:
● An in-depth look at these political issues*:
- Climate Change
- Death Penalty
- Gun Control
- Health Care Reform
- Income Inequality
- Legalizing Marijuana
- Marriage Equality
- Military Spending
* More issues will be added to this app over time.
● Each political issue contains these sections:
“Common Progressive View”: Potential discussion points to use with conservatives about the issue that aim to better resonate with them + links to learn more about the issue from other progressives.
“Common Conservative View”: Potential discussion points about the issue you may hear coming from conservatives + links to learn more about the issue from conservatives themselves.
“Facts and Stats”: A series of facts, stats and graphs (cited w/ links) about the issue with suggestions for how to best use them with conservatives.
“What's in it for them?”: A list of ways in which a conservative may personally benefit should the issue go the progressives' way long-term.
“Quotes from Conservatives”: Quotes from conservatives that support the progressive view on the issue (e.g. quotes from Ronald Reagan in support of gun control).
“Relatable Analogies”: Analogies/stories that explain the progressive view and aim to resonate with conservatives, using topics like sports and raising children.
“Potential Concessions”: Points about the issue that a conservative may use that may be true but don't necessarily change many progressives’ view - and why.
........
The jokes just write themselves. (Maybe let's have a little contest in the comments!)
"Bubble busters: Paul Krugman edition..." If I were running, say the Colbert show, having a debate with "bubble buster" would be hilarious. Sort of like those artificial intelligence programs that mimick a psychiatrist: ".. so tell me how that made you feel?''
"Bubble busters: Paul Krugman edition..." If I were running, say the Colbert show, having a debate with "bubble buster" would be hilarious. Sort of like those artificial intelligence programs that mimick a psychiatrist: ".. so tell me how that made you feel?''
Too bad "common libertarian view" isn't on there. But libertarians being generally better diffused among good programmers, I hope that one will be out soon. On the other hand, it's a job I would hate to see taken over by machines!
Monday, January 20, 2014
Larry Summers' Martin Feldstein Speech
The latest NBER Reporter has the speech Larry Summers gave at the annual NBER "summer camp" for economists. As you would expect, there are some really interesting bits, which provoked a good lunchroom discussion. To my mind it (and this blog post) gets much better toward the end.
The organizing thread is Larry's worries about long term trends in employment and income distribution, and how trends in productivity and innovation affect it. If the word did not have negative connotations, I might term the talk "neo-Luddite," the worry that this time, unlike all the others, technical change, primarily information technology, will be really bad for workers.
Ouch. "Unemployment" figures in the popular press, but it is the fraction of people actively looking for jobs. The far bigger worry among many economists is the rise in "non-employment." One in ten men, 25-50, are simply not working at all or even looking for work.
And what does that last sentence mean? "Technological and social changes" are not disabling millions of people -- work is physically safer than ever. Does he mean that SSDI is a desirable ruse for our government to give up and pay people to not work whose productivity has fallen below a certain threshold?
Anyway, for the rest of Larry's talk he focuses on low wages, which is the deeper driving question. In standard economics Y=AF(K,L), either more technology A or more capital K raise the marginal product of labor and hence wages. So why are we now suspecting that technological progress is reducing wages?
Larry put up a suggestive production function Y = F(βK, L + λ(1 ‒ β)K) in which more capital is supposed to lower wages. I spent a few hours trying to work out his "moment's thought," but was unable to verify its conjectured properties. This looks like a good problem set for a micro class or a blogger with more time on his hands.
Next, and getting more interesting, he put up this table of CPI values
The issue: Are "stagnant wages" really stagnant in real terms? Well, measured in terms of toys or televisions, not at all. In terms of, say, tuition at Harvard and Chicago, yes indeed.
About televisions,
The problem is, early adopters are willing to pay a large premium for new goods. I'm not an expert on hedonic adjustment, but one wonders how it corrects for early-adopter price discrimination.
But on to the real point, really the most interesting of the talk. However measured, "things" have gotten really cheap. They've also gotten a lot better. Many things have gotten so cheap that they are small fractions of our budgets, so further productivity improvement does not show up in cost of living measures. Many services have not gotten cheaper. We count on productivity growth to raise living standards, so the big issue is really productivity growth in services:
And you get another part of the picture. The big price growth, and the big employment growth, are happening in heavily government run or government influenced sectors. Like health care.
Blog readers will know where I stand. Sectors like health care can have huge productivity improvements if governments get out of them. Services like airlines, package delivery, and telecommunications, have all seen huge productivity improvements when governments got out of them. Service sector like retail that our government never was in (other than to slow down low-cost entrants that serve poor people, from A&P to Wal-Mart) have seen huge productivity gains.
Those improvements benefited the denominator of consumer's real wages, and lowered the numerator of income inequality -- pilots don't get paid what they used to. As Larry points out, the burden of taxation goes with the square of the tax rate, so as the economy shifts to services it is simply impossible for the government to keep expanding. But his (to me) depressing forecast of where we are going remains (to me) sadly true.
Larry closes with the deepest thought of all.
The first question is, what distinguishes these new "service" transactions from "widgets?" Larry's list is, from above, "issues of fundamental scarcity: energy, the land under the houses we buy, and goods and services that are produced in complicated, heavily public-sector-inflected ways," and later "sectors where property rights, scarcities, intellectual property, and the like are of fundamental importance."
One line of reasoning looks for a definition by going straight to public choice, and focuses on public-sector-influenced. This does not strike me however to be particularly correlated with widget vs. non-widget. Yes, our government has become, in the apocryphal quote, an insurance company with an army. But other governments have run steel companies, locomotive factories, and oil drilling and refining operations with much the same productivity results as we are seeing in government-provided services.
I find it more interesting to think about the private sector part. What distinguishes medical care (ok, vet, lasik, and plastic surgery; let's think about market economics) and software development from widgets?
I don't think "fundamental scarcity" is it. Energy is turning out not to be fundamentally scarce after all. The long-run supply curve is very elastic. Land in mid-town Manhattan, or in the parts of the San Francisco peninsula permitted for construction by zoning laws is indeed scarce. Land on the outskirts of Las Vegas is cheap.
That leaves "property rights, scarcities" -- scarcity of people with desired skills -- and "intellectual property." To which I might add information and expertise.
So how do we think of a world where things are free and economic transactions consist of performing services for each other -- services that require time (substituted for by software) expertise, and substantial human capital? That does strike me as the important Big Question. Maybe Larry's production function is a place to start.
This gets us far away from Larry's neo-Luddite worries. Which I don't mean to denigrate. But we sort of know the answer. The returns to skill will be large. The fascinating question is why, after 30 years of a rising skill premium, the production of skill seems not to have flooded the market, driving down that premium? Are the government involvement in education, and the disincentives to work Larry mentions perhaps even more powerful disincentives to human capital accumulation than they are to getting up to go to a miserable minimum-wage job?
The organizing thread is Larry's worries about long term trends in employment and income distribution, and how trends in productivity and innovation affect it. If the word did not have negative connotations, I might term the talk "neo-Luddite," the worry that this time, unlike all the others, technical change, primarily information technology, will be really bad for workers.
Ouch. "Unemployment" figures in the popular press, but it is the fraction of people actively looking for jobs. The far bigger worry among many economists is the rise in "non-employment." One in ten men, 25-50, are simply not working at all or even looking for work.
And as you would expect, these patterns are substantially more pronounced if you are less educated. They are substantially more pronounced if you are in a disadvantaged group than if you are in an advantaged group.Larry treads lightly, I think, around the issue non-employment raises. If our economy has a rising "skill premium," in economist language, or "doesn't provide good steady jobs to high school grads like it used to," in the more colorful Grease-era nostalgia of, say, the New York Times, or even if the haves are exploiting greater "power" against the have-nots, you would expect to see, and worry about, wages of low-skill people. But you would not expect to see an army of 25-54 year old men not working at all. Wages in Bangladesh are very low. And 25-54 year old men work really hard. Wages in the US in 1910 were really low, and 25-54 year old men worked really hard. If they didn't, they and their families didn't eat. Which, to be clear, I am not applauding. We're simply trying to understand a phenomenon. How do poor opportunities (if that's the problem) in the US translate into not working rather than working at low wages? Larry:
This is associated with what is also a defining feature of our time. In the United States today a higher fraction of the workforce receives disability insurance than does production work in manufacturing...
These phenomena are related. No one could give a Feldstein lecture without recognizing the possibility that a social insurance program had a distorting disincentive effect and that is certainly the case with respect to disability insurance. But I think it is also fair to say that the evolution and growth of disability insurance is substantially driven also by the technological and social changes that are leading to a smaller fraction of the workforce working.Casey Mulligan might point out that Social Security disability is only one of hundreds of distortions and punitive marginal effective tax rates pushing people out of work.
And what does that last sentence mean? "Technological and social changes" are not disabling millions of people -- work is physically safer than ever. Does he mean that SSDI is a desirable ruse for our government to give up and pay people to not work whose productivity has fallen below a certain threshold?
Anyway, for the rest of Larry's talk he focuses on low wages, which is the deeper driving question. In standard economics Y=AF(K,L), either more technology A or more capital K raise the marginal product of labor and hence wages. So why are we now suspecting that technological progress is reducing wages?
Larry put up a suggestive production function Y = F(βK, L + λ(1 ‒ β)K) in which more capital is supposed to lower wages. I spent a few hours trying to work out his "moment's thought," but was unable to verify its conjectured properties. This looks like a good problem set for a micro class or a blogger with more time on his hands.
Next, and getting more interesting, he put up this table of CPI values
| Good or Service | September 2012 CPI Value (1982-4 = 100) |
| College Tuition and Fees | 706 |
| Medical Care Services | 445 |
| Medical Care | 419 |
| Services | 272 |
| Energy | 258 |
| Food | 234 |
| All Items | 231 |
| Housing | 223 |
| Transportation | 224 |
| Apparel | 127 |
| Durables | 112 |
| Toys | 53 |
| Televisions | 5 |
The issue: Are "stagnant wages" really stagnant in real terms? Well, measured in terms of toys or televisions, not at all. In terms of, say, tuition at Harvard and Chicago, yes indeed.
About televisions,
Television sets at five stand out. That is obviously a reflection of a rather energetic hedonic effort by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.This is an interesting side note on measurement. Do televisions really cost 1/20th of what they cost in 1980? A TV in 1980 cost about $500. A TV now costs about $500. Every computer I have bought since 1982 has cost $2,000. What's going on? Televisions now are much better than televisions back then. The BLS accounts for this fact by comparing televisions when a new model comes in. Suppose an old tube TV is selling for $500. The first LCD television comes in and sells for $5,000, and a few hedge fund managers buy them. The BLS figures that the LCD TV is the same as 10 old fashioned TVs. LCD TV prices drop to $500, and nobody buys tube TVs any more.The BLS figures that LCD TVs are still the same as 10 tube TVs, so the price of all TVs has gone down by a factor of 10, just as if you could buy a tube TV for $50.
The problem is, early adopters are willing to pay a large premium for new goods. I'm not an expert on hedonic adjustment, but one wonders how it corrects for early-adopter price discrimination.
But on to the real point, really the most interesting of the talk. However measured, "things" have gotten really cheap. They've also gotten a lot better. Many things have gotten so cheap that they are small fractions of our budgets, so further productivity improvement does not show up in cost of living measures. Many services have not gotten cheaper. We count on productivity growth to raise living standards, so the big issue is really productivity growth in services:
In those parts of the economy that are well modeled by the introductory economics textbook treatment of widgets - firms producing a thing with workers with increasing marginal costs in a somewhat competitive industry, such as durables, clothes, and cars - we've seen continuing, very substantial growth in real wages as measured by the purchasing power of things that our economy produces. The reason that [measured] real wages in aggregate have stagnated is that much of what people buy are things where there are issues of fundamental scarcity: energy, the land under the houses we buy, and goods and services that are produced in complicated, heavily public-sector-inflected ways. Medical care and educational services are examples of the latter category....Larry puts up a chart of where the jobs are going to be in the future,
And you get another part of the picture. The big price growth, and the big employment growth, are happening in heavily government run or government influenced sectors. Like health care.
As a society, we are going to need to come to grips over the next couple of decades with..the propensity for the slow-growing [and fast-inflating!] sectors to end up in the public sector...
Whether the expansion of those sectors as a share of the economy necessitates a growing share of the public sector in the economy, or whether the share of healthcare and education that takes place in the public sector should decline will be a matter of great public debate. As a country, and not without controversy, we do not seem to be moving toward a smaller public role in healthcare. Nor do other countries in the world. But that will, perhaps, change over time.sIndeed. One conclusion [not Larry's!] you can draw is that greater government involvement has caused lack of competition, innovation, productivity growth and price increase in the sectors it has come to dominate, and therefore is a large part of the cause of stagnant real wages measured by CPI. I don't have any idea by what economic or political force Larry imagines larger shares of any industry "necessitate" government involvement.
Blog readers will know where I stand. Sectors like health care can have huge productivity improvements if governments get out of them. Services like airlines, package delivery, and telecommunications, have all seen huge productivity improvements when governments got out of them. Service sector like retail that our government never was in (other than to slow down low-cost entrants that serve poor people, from A&P to Wal-Mart) have seen huge productivity gains.
Those improvements benefited the denominator of consumer's real wages, and lowered the numerator of income inequality -- pilots don't get paid what they used to. As Larry points out, the burden of taxation goes with the square of the tax rate, so as the economy shifts to services it is simply impossible for the government to keep expanding. But his (to me) depressing forecast of where we are going remains (to me) sadly true.
Larry closes with the deepest thought of all.
..I invite you to consider how the prodigious change associated with information technology that may be qualitatively different from past technological change may have defining implications for our economy going forward. If I have caused you to reflect on the fact that very substantial relative price changes are likely to be associated with dramatic changes in the structure of employment, the nature of economic activity, and the relative importance of the widget-producing firm in our economy, and to consider the implications this will have for the future of the subject with which I began my career in economics under Marty's tutelage, public economics, then I will have served my purpose this afternoon.This is a thought that's been on the back of my mind for a long time as well. Our Econ 101 widget company and supply and demand graph are really strained as a description of most modern transactions. Pretty much anything you buy represents not the transfer of a good, but the application of someone's expertise and information. Even getting your car fixed, you are not buying someone's labor as if you or I could do it but just have better things to do. You're buying expertise, information, the fruits of human and organizational capital. There is a Big Paper to be written thinking through how an economy where "things" have become free but services, information, and expertise constitute economic transactions.
The first question is, what distinguishes these new "service" transactions from "widgets?" Larry's list is, from above, "issues of fundamental scarcity: energy, the land under the houses we buy, and goods and services that are produced in complicated, heavily public-sector-inflected ways," and later "sectors where property rights, scarcities, intellectual property, and the like are of fundamental importance."
One line of reasoning looks for a definition by going straight to public choice, and focuses on public-sector-influenced. This does not strike me however to be particularly correlated with widget vs. non-widget. Yes, our government has become, in the apocryphal quote, an insurance company with an army. But other governments have run steel companies, locomotive factories, and oil drilling and refining operations with much the same productivity results as we are seeing in government-provided services.
I find it more interesting to think about the private sector part. What distinguishes medical care (ok, vet, lasik, and plastic surgery; let's think about market economics) and software development from widgets?
I don't think "fundamental scarcity" is it. Energy is turning out not to be fundamentally scarce after all. The long-run supply curve is very elastic. Land in mid-town Manhattan, or in the parts of the San Francisco peninsula permitted for construction by zoning laws is indeed scarce. Land on the outskirts of Las Vegas is cheap.
That leaves "property rights, scarcities" -- scarcity of people with desired skills -- and "intellectual property." To which I might add information and expertise.
So how do we think of a world where things are free and economic transactions consist of performing services for each other -- services that require time (substituted for by software) expertise, and substantial human capital? That does strike me as the important Big Question. Maybe Larry's production function is a place to start.
This gets us far away from Larry's neo-Luddite worries. Which I don't mean to denigrate. But we sort of know the answer. The returns to skill will be large. The fascinating question is why, after 30 years of a rising skill premium, the production of skill seems not to have flooded the market, driving down that premium? Are the government involvement in education, and the disincentives to work Larry mentions perhaps even more powerful disincentives to human capital accumulation than they are to getting up to go to a miserable minimum-wage job?
Sunday, January 19, 2014
The Big Question: Is there an alternative to Obamacare?
A health policy discussion with Booth colleagues Matthew Gentzkow and Matthew Notowidigdo.
The original is here at the Booth / Capital Ideas website. The other "big ideas" videos are really good.
My views expressed here are summed up a bit more eloquently in a recent WSJ Oped, here, and a longer essay "After the ACA" available here. More on health economics and insurance, including how individual insurance can protect against preexisting conditions on my webpage here, and by clicking the "health economics" link to the right.
The original is here at the Booth / Capital Ideas website. The other "big ideas" videos are really good.
My views expressed here are summed up a bit more eloquently in a recent WSJ Oped, here, and a longer essay "After the ACA" available here. More on health economics and insurance, including how individual insurance can protect against preexisting conditions on my webpage here, and by clicking the "health economics" link to the right.
Monday, January 13, 2014
Two points on inequality
I've stayed out of the inequality - minimum wage business, largely because it strikes me as mostly political posturing rather than serious policy or economics.
A few small points from the blogosphere struck me as interesting enough to pass on, and indicative of that conclusion.
David Henderson, "Minimium Wage not Well Targeted at Reducing Poverty" makes that rather obvious point. How much would raising the minimum wage change the US Gini coefficient, even if it had no employment effects? Not much, obviously, if you think about it just for a moment, and even less when you look at who actually works at minimum wage jobs. Quoting Joseph J. Sabia and Richard V. Burkhauser,
John Goodman "In defense of inequality" takes the goal of less inequality within the US seriously. OK, if inequality in the US is the problem, what is the logical consequence? John notes we now tax wealthy people who want to leave but
Lotteries and gambling by their nature create inequality.
The biggest piece of the day was Ari Fleisher in the Wall Street Journal: "How to fight income inequality: Get Married"
The debate on the apparent ineffectiveness of the war on poverty comes down to this: Did single parenthood among poor people increase of its own, for mysterious social reasons, and only massive money from the government is keeping people from otherwise inevitable destitution? Or did the vast increase in the welfare state contribute to the pathology that now it needs to fix?
Goodman was pretty clearly of the latter view. Fleisher leans to the former, but really fell short on why this happened, and "helping the poor to realize" is pretty hopeless as a policy prescription. They poor are smart, and huge single parenthood rates do not happen because people are just too dumb to realize the consequences, which the see all around them.
From the left, I hear nothing but deafening silence on this correlation.
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reminds us again of why pretax income distributions widened:
Inequality comes from lack of marriage and education. It is not obviously a problem per se, but it is a symptom of social and economic dysfunction. Single-parenthood rates over 50% are a sign of a society in deep trouble.
Raising the minimum wage is then less than a band-aid for the symptoms of a heart-attack sized problem. But why then is the minimum wage so high on the chattering-class agenda?
A few small points from the blogosphere struck me as interesting enough to pass on, and indicative of that conclusion.
David Henderson, "Minimium Wage not Well Targeted at Reducing Poverty" makes that rather obvious point. How much would raising the minimum wage change the US Gini coefficient, even if it had no employment effects? Not much, obviously, if you think about it just for a moment, and even less when you look at who actually works at minimum wage jobs. Quoting Joseph J. Sabia and Richard V. Burkhauser,
- Only 11.3 percent of workers who would gain from the increase live in households officially defined as poor.
- A whopping 63.2 percent of workers who would gain were second or even third earners living in households with incomes equal to twice the poverty line or more.
- Some 42.3 percent of workers who would gain were second or even third earners who live in households that have incomes equal to three times the poverty line or more.
John Goodman "In defense of inequality" takes the goal of less inequality within the US seriously. OK, if inequality in the US is the problem, what is the logical consequence? John notes we now tax wealthy people who want to leave but
...when a wealthy person expatriates, the distribution of income and wealth becomes more equal. Should we reverse course and encourage the John Templetons of this world to get out of town. If equality is a serious goal, we should at least relax the penalties.
At the other end of the income ladder, consider poor immigrants. Every time one comes to our shore, the distribution of income [within the US] becomes more unequal. But the same could be said if the immigrant is rich. Any immigrant who isn’t earning close to the average income is going to make the distribution less equal as a result of his immigration. If equality is a serious goal, we definitely need a different immigration policy.This strikes me as a longstanding sore spot in the redistributionist agenda. If you worry about inequality, why worry only about inequality within the US, and not across national borders? Of course, if you worry about cross country inequality and want to address it with redistribution, the US as a whole, even poor people here, should be sending boats full of money (and goods) to, say, Bangladesh. But I agree with John
...before we rush out and change all these laws let’s stop and reconsider. If inequality is a bad thing, there must be victims. Yet if penniless immigrants come to our shore, knowing that their arrival makes the distribution of income more unequal than it was and knowing that they will be at the bottom of the income ladder initially, then it’s hard to argue they are being victimized.John again:
Then there is federal aid to the students at Harvard. Granted, many of them may be poor right now. But if they were smart enough to get into Harvard, their lifetime expected earnings are way above average. And what’s true of Harvard is true of Yale, Princeton, etc. In fact, an argument can be made that all aid to college students everywhere contributes to inequality. If equality is a goal, at least there should be a lot less of it.Yes. Our government does a huge amount of redistribution and a whole lot of it goes to very well off people.
Lotteries and gambling by their nature create inequality.
it’s hard to think of an institution that causes more inequality than the lottery, even though lotteries are a favorite source of funds for Democratic legislatures and Democratic governors.The natural conclusion is that significantly reducing pretax within-US income inequality isn't really the goal of people advocating higher minimum wages. I'm not clear what the goal is (except maybe to get us all to fight about something other than each week's ACA horror story.)
The biggest piece of the day was Ari Fleisher in the Wall Street Journal: "How to fight income inequality: Get Married"
"Marriage inequality" should be at the center of any discussion of why some Americans prosper and others don't....among families headed by two married parents in 2012, just 7.5% lived in poverty. By contrast, when families are headed by a single mother the poverty level jumps to 33.9%... among white married couples, the poverty rate in 2009 was just 3.2%; for white nonmarried families, the rate was 22%. Among black married couples, the poverty rate was only 7%, but the rate for non-married black families was 35.6%.(See original for sources.) One may object about correlation and causation here, but the fact that non-marriage and poverty go hand in hand is surely worth thinking about. And it's doubly tragic for children.
... the number of children raised in female-headed families is growing throughout America.... 28.6% of children born to a white mother were out of wedlock. For Hispanics, the figure was 52.5% and for African-Americans 72.3%. In 1964, when the war on poverty began, almost everyone was born in a family with two married parents: only 7% were not.
For children, the problem begins the day they are born, and no government can redistribute enough money to fix it.The problem is not teenagers. This is a choice made by adults.
The majority of women who have children outside of marriage today are adult women in their 20s. (Teenagers under 18 represent less than 8% of out-of-wedlock births.)Ari concludes
One of the differences between the haves and the have-nots is that the haves tend to marry and give birth, in that order. .... A better and more compassionate policy to fight income inequality would be helping the poor realize that the most important decision they can make is to stay in school, get married and have children—in that order.This is the elephant in the room, and interesting that one is not allowed to mention it in polite society.
The debate on the apparent ineffectiveness of the war on poverty comes down to this: Did single parenthood among poor people increase of its own, for mysterious social reasons, and only massive money from the government is keeping people from otherwise inevitable destitution? Or did the vast increase in the welfare state contribute to the pathology that now it needs to fix?
Goodman was pretty clearly of the latter view. Fleisher leans to the former, but really fell short on why this happened, and "helping the poor to realize" is pretty hopeless as a policy prescription. They poor are smart, and huge single parenthood rates do not happen because people are just too dumb to realize the consequences, which the see all around them.
From the left, I hear nothing but deafening silence on this correlation.
Meanwhile, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reminds us again of why pretax income distributions widened:
Inequality comes from lack of marriage and education. It is not obviously a problem per se, but it is a symptom of social and economic dysfunction. Single-parenthood rates over 50% are a sign of a society in deep trouble.
Raising the minimum wage is then less than a band-aid for the symptoms of a heart-attack sized problem. But why then is the minimum wage so high on the chattering-class agenda?
What's the Fed doing? One view
Torsten Slok of Deutsche Bank Research, showed me a slide deck he prepared for evaluating the US economy. Here are a few fascinating graphs. Sorry, the slide deck isn't public -- you have to pay DB for this kind of art!
Most hilariously, "forward guidance" seems to be getting harder.
Torsten also makes the case that interest rates are much below the Fed's usual "Taylor rule." Implicitly, it's supply now not "demand." The market of people who are working looks recovered, the large number of people out of the labor force is the problem, and addressing that is, at least, a deviation from usual policy.
The rest of Torsten's slide deck makes a persuasive case that strong growth may finally be just around the corner, a warning to anyone spending a lot of time on "secular stagnation" models!
No editorial here, I just thought the graphs were really interesting. Thanks to Torsten for allowing me to post them.
Most hilariously, "forward guidance" seems to be getting harder.
Torsten also makes the case that interest rates are much below the Fed's usual "Taylor rule." Implicitly, it's supply now not "demand." The market of people who are working looks recovered, the large number of people out of the labor force is the problem, and addressing that is, at least, a deviation from usual policy.
The rest of Torsten's slide deck makes a persuasive case that strong growth may finally be just around the corner, a warning to anyone spending a lot of time on "secular stagnation" models!
No editorial here, I just thought the graphs were really interesting. Thanks to Torsten for allowing me to post them.
Thursday, January 9, 2014
Alternative Lenders
I found an interesting article in the Wall Street Journal on Alternative Lenders to small businesses. Some highlights with comments.
For small and very short loans, quoting the price as an annualized interest rate doesn't really make much sense. The fixed cost of the transaction and the fixed, non-time dependent, probability of repayment seems much more important.
With Credit for Businesses Tight, Nonbank Lenders Offer Financing at a Price
When Khien Nguyen needed $180,000 to open his 13th nail salon near Philadelphia in November, he didn't go to a bank. Mr. Nguyen's credit score had dropped during the recession, so he figured a bank would put him through weeks of aggravation, then reject him.
He turned instead to one of the nonbank, short-term lenders that have been gaining traction since the financial crisis. The lenders cater to small businesses, often at high cost.
Delaware-based Swift Capital reviewed his financial records and social-media sites such as Yelp and Facebook for reviews, then dispatched someone to one of his salons to pose as a customer. Swift wired him the money a few days later....
About two dozen such nonbank lenders—including OnDeck Capital Inc., Kabbage Inc. and CAN Capital Inc.—lent about $3 billion collectively last year, double the 2012 total...
Banks generally require solid credit scores and spend weeks reviewing financial statements, tax returns and business plans.This is one interesting theme of the article -- use of social media and other internet data mining to develop information about credit worthiness and move quickly.
Biz2Credit, an online loan broker for small businesses, says an analysis of loan applications made in December through its website showed big banks approved 18% of loan applications by its customers in December, while small banks approved 49%.
Various nontraditional lenders have stepped into the void...
Alternative lending to small businesses expanded during the financial crisis as bank credit dried up....
In 2008, when the financial crisis hit, sales at Robin's Nest Floral and Garden Center in Easton, Md., dropped by 15%, according to owner Ken Morgan. The 30-year-old company needed $50,000 for a shipment of Christmas decorations. "I went to the bank, where I'd always done business on a handshake, and they were scared and having their belts tightened," he says. He was turned down. ...
It is so heartwarming as an economist to see, even if slowly, all the adjustments we expect. Banks not lending (or forced not to lend)? Someone will start a new business model to fill in the void.
But there is nothing that stops a bank from using new sources of information, streamlining loan approvals and so forth. So if regular banks are not doing it, and if new businesses that want to serve this market are organizing as something other than new "banks," it raises the interesting question, what's wrong with regulation or competition in banking?
Mr. Nguyen is paying 14.9% interest over the loan's six-month term—the equivalent of about 30% annually ...
Interest rates on such loans can run in excess of 50%, on an annualized basis, much higher than on conventional bank loans. Usury laws limiting interest rates generally don't apply to the short-term lenders. Some of the loans are originated in states that don't cap interest rates on commercial loans. Others are structured as private contracts between two businesses. ...Ah, usury, predatory lending consumer protection and all that. That gives us a hint here of the regulatory roadblocks. Now we know why the loans are short term. Wouldn't it be nice if Mr. Nguyen could get a long term loan?
For small and very short loans, quoting the price as an annualized interest rate doesn't really make much sense. The fixed cost of the transaction and the fixed, non-time dependent, probability of repayment seems much more important.
Speaking at a recent Small Business Administration conference, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said the government wants to "do more to knock down barriers to financing,'' ...Hmm. I'm curious which barriers he has in mind, and how many are erected by the self-same government. Isn't the same government behind tightening bank lending standards, limits on bank entry causing these new businesses to have to spring up, interest rate caps, "consumer protection" and more?
Peer-to-peer online-lending platforms channel funds from ordinary investors to borrowers. Private investment partnerships, including hedge funds, make direct loans to struggling businesses, often with costly strings attached. ...
Unlike banks, the short-term lenders don't take deposits, so they need other sources of capital to fund the loans. OnDeck has an $80 million credit facility from a syndicate that includes Goldman Sachs Group Inc."They have a successful business model that we like," says a Goldman spokesman.I found this especially interesting. It's often said that banks just must "transform" deposits to loans, that there is something eternal and magical about deposit funding for risky business lending. Not true apparently, and that gives me heart for my view that real banks could support lending just fine if they had to raise money as equity or long term, non-runnable debt. I wish the article had more about the capital structure of these "banks."
This fall, OnDeck secured another $130 million from, among others, KeyCorp. Adam Warner, president of Key Equipment Finance, says loans to OnDeck and to CAN Capital are "a way to diversify our small-business lending."
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